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 1. Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation. The exercise differs in many important 
ways from most other attempts to empirically compute optimal taxes. Typically, those computational 
exercises start with some version of the optimal taxation framework originally  set up in the seminal 
paper by Mirlees (1971) and go on by trying to feed with empirical measures the formulas produced 
by the theory (e.g. Tuomala 1990). There are two main problems with this procedure: 1) the 
theoretical results become amenable to an operational interpretation only by adopting some very 
special assumptions concerning the preferences, the composition of the population and the structure of 
the tax rule; 2) the empirical measures used as counterparts of the theoretical concepts are typically 
derived from previous estimates obtained under assumptions that are usually very different from those 
used in the theoretical model . As a consequence the consistency between the theoretical model and the 
empirical measures is dubious. At the end, it remains therefore unclear the significance of the 
numerical results. Recently, this literature has received an important contribution by Saez (2001), who 
shows the existence of a very neat link between Mirlees’s formulas and labour supply elasticities, 
which in principle might ease the empirical implementation of the theoretical results. Still, even the 
approach developed by Saez has been so far implemented using very restrictive assumptions on 
preferences and smooth tax rules. As further limitations of this literature, simultaneous household 
decisions and quantity constraints to labour supply choices have been ignored and do not seem to be 
easily accounted for anyway.  
The approach adopted here is completely different. We do not start with theoretical results. 
Instead we start with a microeconometric model of labour supply that uses a rather flexible 
representation of preferences and accounts for simultaneous decisions of household components and 
for quantity constraints on the on the labour supply choices. We then identify optimal tax rules – 
within a class of 6-parameter piece-wise linear rules - by iteratively running the model and 
maximizing a social welfare function (which takes the household utility levels as arguments) under a 
constant tax revenue constraint. The closest previous example adopting a similar approach is probably 
represented by Fortin B, Truchon M, Beausejour L (1993). However, the model they use is still rather 
restrictive in terms of behavioural responses (a Stone-Geary utility function) and is not estimated but 
rather calibrated. The class of tax rules within which we search for the optimum is also more general 
with respect to Fortin et al. (1993).    
  We use and compare two alternative social evaluation criteria: Equality of Opportunity (EOp) 
and the more traditional Equality of Outcome (EO). The latter consists in maximizing a weighted sum 
of individual welfare levels (the “outcomes” of households’ choices). The former is a computable 
concept of equality of opportunity developed by Roemer (1998). The idea motivating the development 
of this new criterion is that “outcomes” are the joint result of “opportunities” and “effort”, and that the 
social planner might wish to account for the inequality due to unequal “opportunities” but not for the 
inequality due to unequal “effort”. This concept is interesting from the policy point-of-view, since the 
majority of citizens in most industrialised countries, although not unfavourable to redistribution, seem 
sensitive to the way that a certain outcome has been attained. Redistribution is more likely to receive 
support if it is designed to correct circumstances that are beyond people’s control (i.e. opportunities). 
On the other hand, if a bad outcome is associated with a lack of effort, redistribution would be much 
less acceptable.  
  In a previous contribution that originated from an international research project, this concept 
has been applied to evaluate the EOp performance of income tax rules in various countries, using a 
relatively simple common model of labour supply behaviour with calibrated parameters
1. This paper 
extends the previous study in several respects. First, to allow for alternative weighting profiles in the 
treatment of income differentials that arise from factors beyond the individuals' control, a generalised 
version of Roemer’s (1998) EOp-criterion is introduced. Secondly, we employ a relatively 
sophisticated model of labour supply that provides a simultaneous treatment of partners’ decisions and 
                                                 
1 See Roemer et al. (2001).     3 
accounts for quantity constraints on the distribution of hours. Finally, while the previous study only 
concerned male heads of household's 25-40 years old this study deals with approximately the entire 
labour force. To our knowledge, this is the first tax evaluation based on models for both married 
couples and single individuals. Most tax evaluations are either based on representative agent models or 
microeconometric models for single individuals or married females conditional on husbands’ income. 
  In Section 2 we illustrate the min features of the microeconometric model of household labour 
supply, estimated on 1994 Nowegian data. A more detailed description of the model is given in the 
Appendix. 
  In Section 3 we explain how we compute the individual welfare levels so that they can be 
compared and aggregated into social welfare functions.  
  In section 4 we present the EO and Eop criteria and the associated social welfare functions 
used to evaluate the effects of the tax rules. 
  In Section 5 the model is used to identify the optimal tax rules according to the alternative 
welfare evaluation criteria.   4 
 
2. The microeconometric labour supply model 
The labour supply model used in this study is detailed described in the Appendix. Here we give a bird-
eye presentation. The model can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit 
model, and differs from the traditional models of labour supply in several respects
 2. First, it accounts 
for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraints, which means that it 
is able to take into account the presence of quantity constraints in the market. Second, it includes both 
single person households and married or cohabiting couples making joint labour supply decisions. A 
proper model of the interaction between spouses in their labour supply decisions is important as most 
of the individuals are married or cohabiting. Third, by taking all details in the tax system into account 
the budget sets become complex and non-convex in certain intervals. For expository simplicity we 
consider in what follows only the behaviour of a single person household.  
In the model, agents choose among jobs characterized by the wage rate w, hours of work h and other 
characteristics. The problem solved by the agent looks like the following: 
(2.1) 







subject to the budget constraint  ( ) ,, cfwhm =  where h denotes hours of work, w is the pre-tax wage 
rate,  j and e  indicates other respectively observed and unobserved job and/or household 
characteristics, m is the pre-tax non-labour income (exogenous), c is disposable income, f(.,.) 
represents the tax rule that transforms pre-tax incomes (wh,m) into net income c, B denotes the set of 
all opportunities available to the household (including non-market opportunities, i.e. a “job” with 
w0 =  and  h0 = ). 
Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the traditional model) but also 
in the number of available jobs of different type. Note that for the same agent, wage rates (unlike in 
the traditional model) can differ from job to job. As analysts we observe the chosen h and w, but we do 
not know exactly what opportunities are contained in B. Therefore we use a probability density 
function to represent B. Let  (,,) phwjdenote the density of jobs of type (,,). hwj  By specifying a 
probability density function on B we can for example allow for the fact that jobs with hours of work in 
a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly depending on agents’ characteristics; or for 
the fact that for different agents the relative number of market opportunities may differ. We assume 
that the utility function can be factorised as 
(2.2)  ( ) ( ) (,),,,(,),, UfwhmhjVfwhmhj ee = , 
where V and e are the systematic and the stochastic component, respectively. Moreover, we assume 
that e  is i.i.d. according to: 
(2.3)  ( ) ( )
1 Prexp uu e
- £=-  
                                                 
2 Examples of previous applications of this approach are found in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), and Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999, 2000). The modeling approach used in these studies differs from the standard labour supply 
models by characterizing behaviour in terms of a comparison between utility levels rather than between marginal variations 
of utility.  These models are close to other recent contributions adopting a discrete choice approach such as Dickens and 
Lundberg (1993), van Soest (1995) and Euwals and van Soest (1999).     5 
The term e is a random taste-shifter that accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of 
the household-job match observed by the household but not by us. It can be shown that under the 
assumptions (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) we can write the probability density function of a choice (h,w,j) as
3: 















The intuition behind expression (2.4) is that the probability of a choice (h,,w,j) can be expressed as the 
relative attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability” p(h,w,j) – of jobs of type (h,w,j).
   The tax rule, however complex, enters the expression as it is, and there is no need to 
simplify it in order to make it differentiable or manageable as in the traditional approach. While the 
traditional approach derives the functions representing household behaviour on the basis of a 
comparison of marginal variations of utility, our approach is based on comparison of discrete levels of 
utility.  
  As explained in the Appendix, the model contains 78 parameters that capture the 
heterogeneity in preferences and opportunities among households and individuals. This version of the 
model is used to simulate the choices given a particular tax rule. Those choices are therefore generated 
by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision units. For the purpose of welfare 
evaluation, however, we also estimate a model with a common utility function (comparable individual 
welfare function). It is this common utily function that is used to compute the individual welfare levels 
that will form the basis of the social welfare evaluation of tax reforms. More details, together with the 
estimates of the common utility are given in Secton 3.      
                                                 
3 See Dagsvik (1994) and Aaberge et al. (1999), who provide two alternative methods for deriving (2.4).   6 
 
3. Specification and estimation of individual welfare functions 
 
As is universally recognized one needs to compare gains in welfare of some to losses in welfare of 
others when concern is turned to the distributional impact of a tax reform. It is non-controversial to 
assume that each individual's welfare increases with increasing income and leisure as is also captured 
by the household-specific utility functions. However, since some individuals live as singles whereas 
others form families and live together the estimated utility functions cannot be considered as 
comparable individual welfare functions. To solve the comparability problem we treat all individuals 
as singles and introduce an individual welfare function that is allowed to vary with age and number of 
children (at various ages), and where we adjust for scale economics in consumption by dividing 
couples' income by the square root of 2. The resulting income (y) is assumed to be enjoyed by each of 
the two adult partners.  The formal definition of the individual welfare function is given by 
 



































where L is leisure, defined as  ( ) 18736 Lh =- ,  s= 1 if he/she works in the public sector (= 0 
otherwise),  A is age, C1, C2, and C3 are number of children below 3, between 3 and 6 and between 7 
and 14 years old, respectively, and y is the individual's income after tax defined by 
 
















Since the possibility for realizing the various combinations of leisure and disposable income 
depend on the market opportunities, the impact of constraints in market opportunities has to be 
accounted for by the method used for estimating the parameters of the individual welfare functions. 
Thus, the density (2.4) where the systematic part of the utility function is replaced by the individual 
welfare function (3.1) may form the basis of the likelihood function. Note, however, that the estimated 
distributions of offered hours and wages will be inserted for p in (2.4). The estimated parameters for 
the individual welfare functions are reported in Table 3.1.   7 
Table 3.1. Estimates of the parameters of the welfare functions for individuals 20 – 62 years old, 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Esimate  Stand.dev. 
Consumption       
  1 g   -0.694  0.086 
 
2 g   3.155  0.144 
Leisure       
 
3 g   -11.862  0.590 
 
4 g   4.552  1.236 
Log age 
5 g   -2.425  0.666 
Log age squared 
6 g   0.326  0.090 
# children, 0 – 2 years old  
7 g   -0.015  0.007 
# children, 3 – 6 years old 
8 g   -0.010  0.006 
# children, 7 – 14 years old 
9 g   -0.003  0.004 
Employed in public sector  
10 g   -0.032  0.011 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 0 – 2 years old  
11 g   0.045  0.030 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 3 – 6 years old 
12 g   0.079  0.033 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 7 – 14 years old 
13 g   0.039  0.016 
  
 
The results in Table 3.1 demonstrate that the curvature parameters of the income and leisure terms are 
statistically significant and make these terms increasing concave. Moreover, the impact of leisure on 
individual welfare is found to depend on age and on the number of children at the age of 0-2 years. 
Moreover, leisure appears to be more important for people working in the public sector except for 
those with children at the age of 3-14 years. The latter effect may be due to the flexibility in hours of 
work arrangements in the public sector
4.  
   
                                                 
4 Statistics Norway has, for example, more than 90 different hours of work arrangement. On top of that, many employees are 
allowed to spend up to three days of work in their home office.   8 
 
4. The EO and EOp criteria 
This informational structure of the individual welfare functions defined by (3.1) allows welfare gains 
and losses of different individuals due to a policy change to be compared. When evaluating the 
welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it may be useful to summarize the gains and losses 
by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function is the one that adds up the comparable 
welfare gains (Vs) over individuals. The objection to the linear additive welfare function is that the 
households are given equal welfare weights, independent of whetherof they are poor or rich. Concern 
for distributive justice requires, however, that poor households are assigned larger welfare weights 
than rich households. This structure is captured by the following family of welfare functions that have 
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where F
-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the individual welfare levels V 
with mean m, and pk(t) is a weight function defined by 
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Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by Wk decreases with increasing k. As  k k,W ﬁ¥  
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It follows by straightforward calculations that  k W £m for all j and that Wk is equal to the mean  m for 
finite k if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted as the equally 
distributed individual welfare level. As recognised by Yaari (1988) this property suggests that Ik, 








can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover is a member of the “illfare-ranked 
single-series Ginis” class introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). As noted by Aaberge 
(2000), I1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), 
whilst I2 is the Gini coefficient.
6 In this paper we will measure individual welfare level with a common 
utility function (see Section 3), although we will also present a comparative exercise where individual 
welfare is measure by monetary income. 
  For a given total welfare (i.e. the sum of individual welfare levels) the welfare functions W1, 
W2, and W3 take their maximum value when everyone receives the same income and may thus be 
                                                 
5 Several other authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson 
and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge (2001). 
6 For further discussion of the family {Ik : k=1, 2, ...} of inequality measures we refer to Mehran (1976), Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980, 1983), Bossert (1990) and Aaberge (2000, 2001).   9 
interpreted as Equality-of-Outcome criteria (EO) when employed as a measure for evaluating tax 
systems.  
   However, as indicated by Roemer (1998) the EO criterion is controversial and suffers from 
the drawback of receiving little support among citizens in a nation.
7 This is due to the fact that 
differences in outcomes resulting from differences in efforts are, by many, considered ethically 
acceptable and thus should not be the target of a redistribution policy. An egalitarian redistribution 
policy should instead seek to equalise those differentials in individual welfare arising from factors 
beyond the control of the individual. Thus, not only the outcome, but its origin and how it was 
obtained, matters. This is the essential idea behind Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity, 
where people are supposed to differ with respect to circumstances, which are attributes of the 
environment of the individual that influence her earning potential, and which are “beyond her control”.  
  This study defines circumstances by family background, and classifies the individuals into 
three types according to father's years of education:  
•  less than 5 years (Type 1),  
•  5-8 years (Type 2), and 
•  more than 8 years (Type 3).  
  Assume that 
1
j F(t)
-  is the welfare level level of the individual located at the t
th quantile of the 
income distribution (Fj) of type j. The differences in welfare levels within each type are assumed to be 
due to different degrees of effort for which the individual is to be held responsible, whereas welfare 
differences that may be traced back to family background are considered to be beyond the control of 
the individual. As indicated by Roemer (1998) this suggests that we may measure a person’s effort by 
the quantile of the welfare distribution where he is located. Next, Roemer declares that two individuals 
in different types have expended the same degree of effort if they have identical positions (rank) in the 
welfare distribution of their type. Thus, an EOp (Equality of Opportunity) tax policy should aim at 
designing a tax system such that 
1
j minF(t)
- is maximised for each quantile t. However, since this 
criterion is rather demanding and in most cases will not produce a complete ordering of the tax 
systems under consideration a weaker ranking criterion is required. To this end Roemer (1998) 










Thus,  W¥ %  ignores income differences within types and is solely concerned about differences that arise 
from differential circumstances. By contrast, the EO criteria defined by (2.1) does not distinguish 
between the different sources that contribute to welfare inequality. As an alternative to (2.1) and (2.5) 









where pk(t) is defined by (2.2). 
  The essential difference between  k W %  and  W¥ %  is that  k W %  gives increasing weight to the 
welfare of lower quantiles in the type-distributions. Thus, in this respect  k W %  captures also an aspect of 
inequality within types. As explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the 




- ˛ . 




-  defines the inverse of the following cumulative distribution function  ( ) F %  
                                                 
7 See also Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).    10 
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where T is a random variable with uniform distribution function (defined on [0,1]). Thus, we may 
decompose the EOp welfare functions  k W %  as we did the EOp welfare functions Wk. Accordingly, we 
have that 
(4.8)  ( ) kk WW1I,k1,2,... ¥ =-= %%%  










is a summary measure of inequality for the mixture distribution  F % . 
  Expression (4.8) shows that the EOp welfare functions  k W %  for k <¥ take into account value 
judgements about the trade-off between the mean income and the inequality in the distribution of 
welfare for the most EOp disadvantaged people. Thus,  k W %  may be considered as an inequality within 
type adjusted version of the pure EOp welfare function that was introduced by Roemer (1998). As 
explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the most disadvantaged type, i.e. 
for the type that forms the largest segment(s) of the mixture distribution  F % . Alternatively,  k W %  for 
k <¥ may be interpreted as an EOp welfare function that, in contrast to  W¥ % , gives increasing weight 
to individuals who occupy low effort quantiles. 
  Note that the EOp criterion was originally interpreted as more acceptable￿from the point of 
view of individualistic-conservative societies. Our extended EOp welfare functions can be considered 
as a mixture of the EO welfare functions and the pure EOp welfare function; they are concerned about 
inequality between types as well as inequality within the worst-off distribution defined by (4.7). EOp 
looks at what happens to the distribution formed by the most disadvantaged segments of the 
intersecting type-specific distributions (defined by (4.7)). Moreover, the pure version of the criterion 
only looks at the mean of the worst-off distribution. By contrast, EO takes into account the whole 
income distribution. For a given sum of incomes, EO will consider equality of welfare (everyone 
attains the same level of welfare) as the most desirable welfare distribution. The pure EOp will instead 
consider equality in mean welfare across types as the ultimate goal. Since the extended EOp combines 
these two criteria, transfers that reduce the differences in the mean welfare between types as well as 
the welfare differentials between the individuals within the worst-off distribution are considered 
equalising by the extended EOp. Thus, in the case of a fixed total welfare also the extended EOp will 
consider equality of income as the most desirable distribution. However, by transferring money from 
the most advantaged type to the most disadvantaged type, EOp inequality may be reduced although 
transfers may be conflicting with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Whether it is more “efficient” to 
reduce inequality between or within types depends on the specific situation. When labour supply 
responses to taxation are taken into account the composition of types in the worst-off distribution will 
change and depend on the chosen welfare function  ( ) k W %  as well as on the considered tax rule. Thus, 
the large heterogeneity in labour supply responses to tax changes that is captured by our model(s) 
makes it impossible to state anything on EOp- or EO-optimality before the simulation exercises have 
been completed.   11 
5. Optimal tax-transfer rules  
The purpose of this section is to present an exercise where we locate the optimal tax rules given a 
fixed total net tax revenue, from the point of view of EO and EOp criteria. To this end we employ the 
labour supply model and simulation framework explained in section 2 and in the Appendix  to 
simulate the labour supply behaviour of single females, single males, and couples that are between 18 
and 54 years old. To capture the heterogeneity in preferences we have estimated three separate models 
of labour supply: one for single females, one for single males and one for couples.   
  The search for the optimal tax rule is limited to the class of 3-brackets, piecewise-linear rules, 
with 
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where y is net available income,  Z is gross income,  E is the exemption level , ( 1 t ,   2 t  , 3 t ) are the 
marginal tax rates applied to the three brackets of income above the exemption level,  1 Z  is the upper 
limit of the first bracket and 2 Z is the upper limit of the second bracket. Thus, each particular tax rule is 
characterized by the six parameters:  E ,   1 t ,   2 t  , 3 t ,  1 Z  and  2 Z . 
The tax rule specified by (5.1) replaces the current rule as of 1995, which is described in Table 5.1. All 
transfers implemented by welfare policies (social assistance, income support related to disability etc.) 
are kept unchanged under the alternative tax rules.   
 
Table  5.1.  Current tax rule in Norway as of 1995 
 
Tax function for singles without children and couples without children and with two wage 
earners . NOK 1994. 
Gross income  Tax 
[0 – 17000)  0 
[17000 – 24709)  0.25Y - 4250 
[24709 – 28250)  0.078Y   
[28250 – 140500)  0.302Y - 6328 
[140500 – 208000)  0.358Y - 14196 
[208000 – 234500)  0.453Y - 33956 
[234500 – )  0.495Y - 43804 
  
Tax function for couples without children and with one wage earner. NOK 1994 
Gross income  Tax 
[0 – 17000)   0 
[17000 – 24709)  0.25Y - 4250 
[24709 – 56500)  0.078Y 
[56500 – 140500)  0.302Y - 12656 
[140500 – 252000)  0.358Y - 20524 
[252000 – 263000)   0.453Y - 44464 
[263000 – )      0.495Y - 55510 
   12 
 
The identification of optimal tax rules consists of six main steps: 
1.  The tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in order to obtain disposable incomes. 
New labour supply responses in view of a new tax rule are taken into account by the household 
labour supply model . Note that the utility functions (and choice sets) of the underlying 
microeconometric model(s) are stochastic. Thus, we use stochastic simulation to find, for each 
individual/couple, the optimal choice given a tax-transfer rule. The simulations are made under the 
conditions of constant total tax revenue and non-negative disposable household incomes.  
2.  To each decision maker (wife or husband) between 18 and 54 years old, an equivalent income is 
imputed, computed as total disposable household income divided by the square root of the number 
of household members.  
3.  As a result of the previous steps, we now have for each individual a simulated quadruple 
(,,,) chj e . We then compute the individual welfare levels by applying to the chosen 
(,,,) chj e the common utility function (see section 3).   
4.  When adopting the Eop criterion we build the individual welfare distributions F1, F2 and F3 for the 
types defined according to parental (actually father’s) education: less than 5 years (type 1), 5-8 
years (type 2) and more than 8 years (type 3).  
5.  Finally, we compute  k W  and  k W %  for k =1, 2, 3 and ¥. 
6.  Optimization is performed by iterating the above steps, in order to find the tax rule that produces 
the highest value of  k W  or  k W %  for each value of k under the constraint of unchanged tax revenue. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5.2 and in Graphs 5.1 – 5.4.  The first two graphs cover the whole 
range of income values, while graphs 5.3 and 5.4 zoom on low and average incomes levels.  
•  The Table and the Graphs show that the more egalitarian the criterion is, the more  progressive 
is the optimal tax rule. For example the optimal rule according to Bonferroni is more 
progressive than the optimal rule according to Gini, which in turn is more progressive than the 
optimal utilitarian rule. 
•  The differences implied by using the EO or the EOp criterion seem negligible. This is 
interesting since EOp is usually interpreted as a less interventionist criterion than EO: still, 
when empirically implemented they both seem to require very similar tax rules, even slightly 
more progressive the one implied by EOp .   
•  Overall, the structure of the optimal rules is not dramatically different from the current rule: 
all the rules envisage a smooth sequence of increasing marginal tax rates.  
•  There are however also two important differences between the current and the optimal rules. 
First, all the optimal rules imply a higher net income for most levels of gross income. In other 
words, the optimal rules are able to extract the same total tax revenue from a larger total gross 
income (i.e. applying a lower average tax rate). The result is due to a sufficiently high labour 
supply response estimated and accounted for by the model.  Second, the marginal tax rates 
applied to very high income are essentially identical in the current and in the optimal tax rule 
(around 50%). It is on low and average income brackets that the optimal rules apply markedly 
lower marginal rates as compared to the current rule. 
•  The last comment provides a controversial perspective in view of the tax reforms implemented 
in many developed countries during the last decades. In most cases those reforms embodied 
the idea of improving efficiency and labour supply incentives through a lower average tax rate 
and lower marginal tax rates on higher incomes.  Our optimal tax computations give support 
to the first part (lowering the average tax rate), much less to the second: on the contrary our 
results suggest that a lower average tax rate should be obtained by lowering the marginal tax 
rates particularly on low and average income brackets.  
   13 
    
 
 




EO-social welfare  
 
  EOp-social welfare  
  W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 
(Gini)     




~ W  
(Bonferroni) 
2




W   ¥ W ~
 
(Utilitarian) 
1 t   .12  .18  .23  .22    .12  .14  .15  .17 
2 t   .38  .35  .35  .30    .41  .37  .35  .30 
3 t   .50  .50  .50  .50    .50  .50  .50  .50 
E  0  11224  24436  11980    .0  .0  .0  .0 
1 Z   150000  150000  200000  200000    131880  134278  135178  128397 
2 Z   500000  500000  500000  500000    500000  500000  500000  500000   14 
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Graph 5.3 
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Graph 5.4 
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Appendix 
The micro-model - Empirical specification and estimation results 
The modelling approach of this paper differs from the traditional textbook model by treating the utility 
function as a random variable and analysing labor supply as a random utility maximization problem. 
This framework can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit model; see 
Dagsvik (1992) and Aaberge et al. (1999) for further details. For the sake of completeness we give a 
brief outline of this modelling framework. 
 
To account for the fact that single individuals and married couples may face different choice sets and 
exhibit different preferences over income and leisure we estimate separate models for single females 
and males and married couples. 
A.1. Single females and males 
The utility functions for single females and males is assumed to be of the following form 
 
 
( ) (,),,(,,) UfwhIhsvhwse =                   A1.    
where 
w = wage rate 
h = hours of work 
I = exogenous income 
s= 1 if the job belongs to the Public Sector (= 0 otherwise), 
( ) , fwhI  is disposable income (income after tax) measured in 100 000 NOK  
and e follows a Type III estreme value distribution.  


































        A2. 
where    21 
L is leisure, defined as  ( ) 18736 Lh =- ,  
A is age,  
C1, C2, and C3 are number of children below 3, between 3 and 6 and between 7 and 14 years old, 
respectively.  
 
The parameters a are gender-specific.  
 
The children terms are dropped in the utility function for single males since we observe very few 
children living with single males. 
 
The stochastic components e  are assumed to be independently drawn from a Type IIII extreme value 
distribution. 
   
The individuals maximise their utility by choosing among opportunities defined by hours of work, 
hourly wage and sector of employment. Opportunities with  0 h = (and  0 w= ) are non-market 
opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). 
 











= ￿ -= ￿
              A3. 
where 
 
p0 is the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set; 
g1s, g2s and  3 g  are respectively the densities of hours, wages, and opportunities in sector S, conditional 
upon the opportunity being a market job.  
 
Given the above assumption upon the stochastic component and upon the density of opportunities, it 














  .            A4. 
In view of the empirical specification it is convenient to divide both numerator and denominator by 
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      A6. 
for { } ,0 hw =  
 
 
Except for possible peaks corresponding to part time (pt, 18-20 weekly hours) and to full time (ft, 37-
40 weekly hours) we assume that the distribution of offered hours is uniformly distributed. Thus, g1 is 
given by 
[ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ]




                                 if        1,17
exp      if        18,20
()                                 if        21,36
exp       if        37,40




























             A7. 
where w is the maximum observed value of h. 
Since the density values must add up to 1, we can also compute  s g  according to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1234 1712018)exp36214037exp411 s ss gppppw -+-++-+-++-= . 
We also specify: 
( ) 0312 ()exp(1) ggsss mm =+-               A8. 
The above parameters p and  m vary by gender. In the Tables we refer to p  and m  as the parameters 
of the job opportunity density. 
  The density of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with mean that depends on length of 
schooling (Ed) and on past potential working experience (Exp), where experience is defined to be 
equal to age minus length of schooling minus five, i.e. 
2
0123 log wExpExpEd bbbbsh =++++               A9. 
where h is standard normally distributed. The parameters b  vary by gender and sector of 
employment. 
  The estimation of the models for single individuals and married couples is based on data from 
the 1995 Survey of Level of Living. For a more detailed description of the data and definition of   23 
variables we refer to the appendix. We have restricted the ages of the individuals to be between 18 and 
54 in order to minimize the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible for 
retirement, since analysis of retirement decisions is beyond the scope of this study. 
  The parameters appearing in expressions (A1)-(A5) are estimated separately for single females 
and males by the method of maximum likelihood. The likelihood functions are equal to the products of 
the individual-specific labor supply densities for single females and males, respectively. The estimates 
of the preference and opportunity density parameters are reported in Table A1 and A3.   24 
 
Table A1. Estimates of the parameters of the utility functions for single females and males. 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Single females  Single males 
    Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Consumption           
  a1  -0.59  (0.28)  0.24   (0.33) 
  a2  4.37  (0.52)  2.27   (0.44) 
Leisure           
  a3  0.65  (0.92)  0.76   (0.99) 
  a4  498.50  (145.18)  337.40   (128.84) 
Log age  a5  -265.77  (79.22)  -180.89   (70.63) 
Log age squared  a6  36.36  (10.89)  24.81   (9.75) 
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  3.62  (2.43)     
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  -0.36  (7.87)     
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  -2.24  (1.42)     
Employed in public sector   a10  -2.97  (0.87)  -2.20  (0.90) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 0 – 2 
years old  
a11  -7.29  (7.46)     
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 3 – 6 
years old 
a12  -1.02  (2.10)     
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 7 – 
14 years old 
a13  1.15  (1.10)     
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A2. Married couples 
The labor supply model for married couples accounts for both spouses’ decisions through the 






































































where the leisure Li  is defined as  ( ) 18736 =- ii Lh , i = F, M. We allow for sector- and gender-
specific job opportunities in accordance with the functional forms ((A2)-(A6)) that were used for 
single females and males.  
In this case the households choose among opportunities defined by a vector ( ) ,,,,, MFMFMF hhwwss. 
Here  1 k S =  if the partner of gender k is employed in the public sector, with k = M, F. Analogously to 
















1()()() if 0,0 





























                        A11. 
The choice density of an opportunity  ( ) ,,,,, MFMFMF hhwwss is: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )





















For the purpose of empirical specification and estimation it is convenient to divide the density  ( ) p by 
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Now the choice density can be written as follows: 
 








  A14. 
if both work; 
 







j =     A15. 
if only the husband works; 
 
 







j =       A16. 
if only the wife works; 
 
 




j =                
    A17. 
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The hours densities and the wage densities are the same as specified for singles. The same applies to 
03 () MM ggs  and  03 () FF ggs . Moreover: 
   27 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 03301212 ()()exp(11 MFMFMMMMFFFF ggsgsssss mmmmm =++-++-     A19. 
 
The estimates of the parameters for couples are reported in Table A2 and A3. 
   28 
Table A2. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function for married/cohabitating couples. 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
       
Consumption       
  a1  0.14   (0.09) 
  a2  6.49   (0.43) 
Wife’s leisure       
  a3  -3.81   (0.43) 
  a4  194.89   (28.53) 
Log age  a5  -107.09  (15.88) 
Log age squared  a6  15.14   (2.23) 
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  0.34   (0.31) 
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  1.31   (0.31) 
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  1.70   (0.26) 
Employed in public sector   a10  -0.95  (0.30) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 0 – 2 years old   a11  0.40  (0.33) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 3 – 6 years old  a12  0.39  (0.32) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 7 – 14 years old  a13  -0.97  (0.24) 
Husband’s leisure       
  a14  -1.01  (039) 
  a15  222.99  (41.03) 
Log age  a16  -116.55  (22.34) 
Log age squared  a17  15.85  (3.06) 
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a18  -0.08  (0.40) 
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a19  -0.30  (0.35) 
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a20  -0.15  (0.25) 
Employed in public sector   a21  -0.60  (0.51) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 0 – 2 years old   a22  -0.16  (0.39) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 3 – 6 years old  a23  -0.93  (0.31) 
Empl. in pub. sec. * # child., 7 – 14 years old  a24  -0.16  (0.25) 
Leisure interaction between spouses  a25  4.84  (1.12) 
*) Standard deviations in parentheses.   29 
 
 
Table A3.  Job, Hours and Wage densities, Norway 1994 
    Females  Males 
  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Job opportunity           
  µ1  -2.10  (0.18)  -3.17  (0.23) 
  µ2  -1.51  (0.18)  -2.68  (0.20) 
  µ3  1.39  (0.17)  1.39  (0.17) 
Hours           
  p1  0.49  (0.13)  -0.50  (0.22) 
 
2 p   -0.23  (0.23)  0.09  (0.51) 
 
3 p   1.47  (0.09)  1.81  (0.07) 
 
4 p   0.03  (0.14)  0.06  (0.13) 
Wage – Private sector            
 
0 b   3.62  (0.07)  3.50  (0.06) 
 
1 b   3.93  (0.50)  5.38  (0.41) 
 
2 b   2.60  (0.30)  2.83  (0.31) 
 
3 b   -4.04  (0.64)  -4.41  (0.64) 
  s   0.24  (0.00)  0.28  (0.01) 
Wage - Public sector           
 
0 b   3.71  (0.08)  3.62  (0.09) 
 
1 b   3.59  (0.46)  4.95  (0.47) 
 
2 b   2.14  (0.33)  2.46  (0.44) 
 
3 b   -3.37  (0.71)  -3.82  (0.91) 
  s   0.18  (0.01)  0.22  0.01 
 
 
 
 